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ABSTRACT 
 
This study focuses on technical efficiency measures and its decompositions as well as the 
relationship between efficiency and banking competition of Malaysian commercial banks. 
This study employs Data Envelopment Analysis to assess efficiency performance of 
Malaysian commercial banks during 1996–2011 while to estimate banking competition; 
Lerner index approach is utilised. Next, Granger causality tests between competition 
indexes and various measures of efficiency are undertaken to investigate "Does 
competition foster efficiency?" The evidence suggests that Malaysian commercial banks 
experienced increased concentration coupled with lower competition. The results of 
causality tests support a positive effect of competition on technical efficiency in 
Malaysian banking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Malaysian financial industry can be divided into banking industry, non-banking 
financial intermediaries and financial markets. The Central Bank of Malaysia 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, BNM) constitutes the apex of the banking industry, 
comprising commercial banks, investment banks, foreign bank representative 
offices and offshore banks in the International Offshore Financial Centre in 
Labuan as well as Islamic banks. The Malaysian banking sector has always 
presented the most important financial intermediaries and acts as the primary 
source of financing of an economy. The Malaysian Seventh Plan for 1996–2000 
was set out to strengthen and modernise the banking industry so as to provide 
new instruments of funding and at the same time, to promote savings (Economic 
Planning Unit, 1996). In addition, the Eighth Plan 2001–2005 outlined the thrust 
of the financial sector lay in creating a strong, competitive and resilient domestic 
financial system to meet the challenges of globalisation (Economic Planning 
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Unit, 2001). The restructuring of the financial institutions through consolidation 
would facilitate the development of an efficient and competitive banking system 
to support the growth of the economy. Next, the phased implementation of the 
10-year Financial Sector Master Plan and Capital Market Master Plan during the 
Ninth Plan period (2006–2010) strengthened the resilience and competitiveness 
of the banking system and the capital market in a more globalised operating 
environment (Economic Planning Unit, 2006). At the same time, domestic 
financial institutions were encouraged to expand abroad whilst the Islamic 
financial system continued to be further developed to tap its potential and serve 
as a new source of growth. The importance of the role of financial intermediaries 
is kept recognised by Malaysian government throughout its long-term policy in 
Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011–2015 (Economic Planning Unit, 2011). The second 
thrust of Tenth Malaysian Plan stated the urgency to create conducive 
environment to unleash economic growth, by emphasising on 12 sectors of 
National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs); and financial services sector is listed as 
one of the NKEAs to be exploited. The New Economic Model of Malaysia 
highlighted that the growth in financial development is needed in order to 
stimulate private investment (Economic Planning Unit, 2011). 
 
Commercial banks in Malaysia are licensed under the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) by BNM. The roles of commercial 
banks include raising funds by collecting checkable deposits, savings deposits 
and time deposits from businesses and individuals; then, the banks give out loans 
to both customers and other business as defined by BNM (Institute of Banker 
Malaysia, 2013). The commercial banks are the largest component of the 
Malaysian banking system, comprise of 25 commercial banks (excluding Islamic 
banks) of which 17 are locally incorporated foreign banks (Central Bank of 
Malaysia, 2011). In year 2011, the share of commercial banks with respect to 
total assets is RM1,713 (‘000 million), total loans (RM798,359 million) and total 
deposits is RM699,421 million (The Association of Banks in Malaysia, 2012).  
 
The economic malaise in the end of 1990s has triggered the banking 
reform and has changed the Malaysian banking sector landscape profoundly. The 
enforcement of Malaysia’s bank mergers in 1999 resulted in the mergers of all 
domestic commercial banks into several merged entities. Prior to bank mergers, 
there were 38 commercial banks of which 22 were domestic banks while 16 
banks were foreign-controlled banks in Malaysian banking system in year 1998. 
In Malaysian banking industry, mergers and acquisitions can be traced to the 
historical reluctance of local banks to merge. The policy had always been to 
allow for market forces to dictate the pace of mergers. Even with the 
government’s efforts, the shareholders of banking institutions were more 
interested in protecting their interests than paying heed to national considerations 
(Central Bank of Malaysia, 1999). Nevertheless, the currency and financial crisis 
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in July 1997 sharply impacted on the Malaysian economy. Banking institutions 
were badly hit by the crisis as they were burdened with high levels of non-
performing loans arising from over-lending to the property industry and over-
exposure to share-based lending in the 1980s. Due to the losses, BNM came up 
with a rescue scheme to protect the integrity of public savings and stabilise the 
financial system. The rescue scheme involved the establishment of asset 
management companies to persuade and encourage local market participants to 
voluntarily merge. However, the banks remained reluctant to merge. Hence, the 
government proceeded to set in motion the consolidation process with BNM and 
expressed its intention to consolidate the local banks in April 1999.  
 
The impact of bank mergers had created concerns among policy makers 
and researchers in terms of potential anticompetitive conducts of banks. 
Structurally speaking, bank mergers generate more concentrated systems and as a 
result, worsen bank competition. The preponderance of mergers has raised 
concerns that increased concentration is likely to intensify market power and 
therefore, hinder the realisation of competition. Additionally, restructuring in the 
banking industry would stimulate those firms operating inefficiently to shift to 
the frontier. Banks not allocating their resources efficiently would be liquidated 
or would merged with more efficient banks; unless they could become more like 
their efficient competitors by producing more outputs with existing inputs. 
Therefore, it is important to have a better understanding of the potential 
consequences of bank reform on banking competition as well as banking 
efficiency. A strong and resilient banking system should support economic 
efficiency and stability, where efficiency is closely related to the optimal 
competitive structure (Northcott, 2004). 
 
Competition and efficiency are closely entwined in banking system; 
however, majority of past efficiency studies on banking industry have tended to 
neglect the nexus between competition and efficiency. Few attempts have been 
undertaken to investigate the relationship between bank competition and 
efficiency of banks, however they rely on structural measure of competition by 
taking concentration per se as a proxy for competition; whilst with respect to 
efficiency, only cost efficiency is estimated. Apart from that, the link between 
market structure and competition is not investigated. By addressing the above 
discussion as the gap in the literature, this study contributes to the existing 
literature by utilising Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute technical 
efficiency scores and its decompositions, which are pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency. While Lerner Index model is utilised to estimate competitiveness 
in the banking industry, market concentration is used to measure market 
structure.  
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Finally, Granger causality tests between competition indexes and 
measures of efficiency are undertaken to test the relationship between 
competition and efficiency in Malaysian banking market during 1996–2011. The 
rest of this article is organised as follows. Next section provides a brief 
discussion on the literature review of the nexus between concentration, 
competition and efficiency in banking sector, and it is followed by a description 
of data and the methodology in subsequent section. Next section presents the 
results of the market structure and competition as well as the nexus between 
various measures of efficiency and banking competition; this article ends with 
conclusions in the last section. 
 
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
The theoretical foundation for the relationship between competition and 
efficiency in the banking market are emanated from theories on market structure 
and efficiency. The rationale behind the link between market structure and 
efficiency originates from the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis. Hicks (1935, p. 35) states 
that “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life”. The quotation suggests that 
in concentrated markets, there is less pressure to compete, which results in 
reduced efforts by managers to operate efficiently. Therefore, increased market 
concentration weakens market competition which will halts productive 
efficiency. The ‘quiet life’ hypothesis also constitutes the ‘structure conduct 
performance’ hypothesis as proposed by Bain (1951), which postulates that banks 
in a concentrated market can charge higher loan rates and pay lower deposit rates, 
generating more profits and lower collusion costs; as a result, competition will 
decline. Thus, both hypotheses propose for the positive link of ‘competition-
efficiency’; increased concentration results in lowered competition which leads to 
a decrease in efficiency.  
 
In a view of industrial organisation theory, the level of concentration in a 
market will determine the competitiveness level among firms in the market. 
Basically, the 'structure-conduct-performance' paradigm views that markets 
which are dominated by few large firms (highly concentrated) are less 
competitive than markets which are low concentrated (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1951). 
The hypothesis contends that the higher the concentration, the lower the 
competition; increased market concentration is associated with higher prices and 
greater profits (Bain, 1951). Nevertheless, the 'efficient-structure' hypothesis 
infers that the degree of concentration is determined by the superior performance 
of the efficient banks. 'Efficient-structure' hypothesis postulates that firms with 
superior efficiency become more profitable, the firms will increase their market 
share; as a result, the competition declines. (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977). 
Both 'structure-conduct-performance' and 'efficient-structure' theories which are 
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known as structural approach postulate that market concentration determine the 
competitive conduct of firms in a market. On contrary, the non-structural 
approach suggests that there is no clear evidence that in more concentrated 
markets, the market power is higher and that competition is lower. The 
contestable market theory emphasises that a high concentration market can be 
highly competitive even if it is dominated by few firms only (Baumol, 1982). 
 
In addition, Leibenstein (1966) argues that competition can reduce ‘x-
inefficiencies’ or inefficiencies inside firms. The existence of imperfections in the 
internal organisation of firms which affect the level of information asymmetries 
between owners and managers will results in x-inefficiencies. Eventually, the 
flaw in the labour contract will lessen the effort of managers and as the owners 
are unable to check the level of effort exerted by the managers, Liebenstein 
suggests two reasons to explain how competition can reduce ‘x-inefficiencies’. 
Firstly, managers are aware that the only way to sustain performance in a 
competitive market is to cut cost and produce more, which means that managers 
must increase their work efforts. Managers are motivated to avoid the personal 
costs of firms’ bankruptcy. Secondly, when competition is running high; 
shareholders of firms tend to compare the firms’ performance relative to their 
rivals. The owners have the authority to change the management if necessary; 
thus, managers see this as a drive to increase their efforts and to reduce ‘x-
inefficiencies’. In this context, the relationship of ‘competition-efficiency’ is 
asserted. 
 
On the other hand, 'efficient-structure' hypothesis posits a reverse 
causality between competition and efficiency (Demsetz, 1973). It is contended 
that relatively, more efficient firms possess more superior products, advancement 
in technology or better management. Firms may be exploiting greater x-
efficiency (efficiency hypothesis) or greater scale efficiency, which is known as 
scale efficiency hypothesis (Berger, 1995). Therefore, more efficient firms mean 
that the firms have lower costs, which enable them to capture larger market 
shares, resulting in higher market concentration. As concentration is considered 
as an inverse measure of competition, it is suggested that there is a negative link 
between competition and efficiency.  
 
The preceding discussion gives some highlight on the theoretical 
references about the nexus between competition and efficiency. The empirical 
evidences which directly addressed the relationship between competition and 
banking efficiency appear to be limited. Most of the existing studies on the nexus 
of competition and efficiency regressing efficiency scores on a set of variables 
for market structure. Studies such as Berger (1995) and Berger and Hannan 
(1998) confine their analysis on the United States of America (US) banking 
market while Goldberg and Rai (1996) and Punt and van Rooij (1999) focus on 
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European banks. The studies support a positive relationship between efficiency 
and market concentration, in favour of the ‘efficient structure’ hypothesis. The 
mentioned studies measure cost efficiency by employing stochastic frontier 
approach while market structure is measured with market concentration indices.  
 
Empirical studies that test the running causality between efficiency and 
competition are scant. The most notable’s study is Casu and Girardone (2009); 
the study reveals the causality relationship by employing Granger-causality tests. 
The study finds the negative magnitude between efficiency and competition in 
selected EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) 
over 2000–2005 periods. The authors find that there is a positive causation 
between market power and efficiency; whereas, the causality running from 
efficiency to competition is weak. Next, Pruteanu-Podpiera, Weill and Schobert 
(2008) investigate the effects of banking competition on efficiency measures in 
the Czech Republic between 1994 and 2005. The study rules out the competition 
improvement over the study period. The results offer support to the negative 
relationship between cost efficiency scores and the banking competition; thus, the 
‘quiet life’ hypothesis is rejected. Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2007) 
analyses the relationship between market power and efficiency in the EU 
countries over 1993–2002. Regressing market power variables which are 
represented by Lerner index and Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) and other 
explanatory variables (size of banks and types of banking specialisation) on the 
dependent variable which is the cost efficiency variable, the results of the study 
reject the 'quiet life' hypothesis in the European banking system. Schaeck and 
Čihák (2008) offers support to the pro-competition policies in European and U.S. 
markets by suggesting that competitive banks are able to allocate resources more 
efficiently to bank customers. The testimony is confirmed further in Koetter, 
Kolari and Spierdijk (2008) study of U.S. banking market between 1986 and 
2005.  
 
No known studies have investigated the relationship between competition 
and efficiency in the context of the Malaysian banking industry. Attempts to 
measure competition and efficiency of Malaysian banks have been carried out on 
separate basis. For instance, Abdul-Majid and Sufian (2006) examine the 
competitive conditions of Malaysian banking industry; the results imply that 
Malaysian banks are operating in monopolistic competition market structure. 
Other studies such as Omar, Abdul-Rahman, Mohd.-Yusof, Abd.-Majid and 
Mohd.-Rasid (2006), Sufian (2007), Ahmad-Mokhtar, Abdullah, and M-Alhabshi 
(2008), Yeoh and Hooy (2011), Ab-Rahim, Md-Nor, and Ramlee (2012), and 
Ab-Rahim (2015), amongst all; confine their studies to assess the efficiency 
performance of the Malaysian financial institutions. Employing data envelopment 
analysis, Yeoh and Hooy (2011) and Ab-Rahim (2015) find that there is a 
declining trend in mean technical efficiency across all Malaysian banks around 
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the period from 2000 to 2011. The results of earlier studies such as Sufian (2007) 
also show the declining trend of technical efficiency scores among merchant 
banks and the finance companies. In order to improve their productivity, Omar et 
al. (2006) add Malaysian banks should utilised advanced technology and acquire 
more technological knowledge in banking system. 
 
Hence, this study contributes to the literature by extending the analysis of 
the relationship between efficiency and competition to developing countries, 
specifically Malaysian banking market. As far as this study is concerned, this is 
the first empirical study on testing the relationship between efficiency and 
competition in Malaysian banking industry.  
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Input and Output Variables 
 
This study covers the period from 1996 to 2011, consists of nine domestic anchor 
banks created due to the merger policy. The commercial banks include Affin 
Bank, Alliance Bank, AMBank, CIMB Bank, EON Bank, Hong Leong Bank, 
Maybank, Public Bank and RHB Bank.1 The bank level data used are taken from 
(2000) spreadsheets published by Bureau Van Dijk (BVD). All financial 
variables reported are in nominal values (Ringgit Malaysia), so to facilitate 
comparison over time; all the variables are deflated by the consumer price index 
(hereafter denoted as CPI) to obtain real values in 2000 price constant.2  
 
As the purpose of this study is to evaluate the efficiency of banks with 
banks acting as financial intermediaries, this study employs the intermediation 
approach like many studies on banking efficiency. Mlima and Hjalmarsson 
(2002) suggested that intermediation roles include mobilising and distributing 
resources efficiently in order to smoothen investment activities. The approach 
views financial institutions as mediators between the depositor (supply) and the 
borrower (demand) of funds at the lowest cost. The approach is also superior in 
evaluating the importance of frontier efficiency as the minimisation of total cost 
(besides production cost) is needed to maximise profits. The input variables 
chosen in this study are personnel expenses, fixed assets, deposits and short term 
funding (deposits) whereas the output variables are represented by total loans, 
total securities and off-balance sheet items. Subsequently, the intermediation 
approach is maintained in the estimation of competition in the Malaysian banking 
sector. Input prices employed are calculated as price of labour (total expenditure 
on employees such as salaries, employee benefits and reserves for retirement pay, 
divided by total assets); price of capital (the ratio of non-interest expenses to the 
Rossazana Ab Rahim 
8 
book value of premises and fixed assets) and price of deposits (total interest 
expenses divided by total deposits and short-term funding).  
 
Methodology 
 
Data envelopment analysis 
 
The main non-parametric method, DEA, was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhoades (1978) and is an analytical tool used to measure relative efficiency of 
firms throughout the process of transforming inputs into outputs. The following 
presents two types of envelopment surfaces, referred to as the constant returns to 
scale and variable returns to scale models. The DEA procedures are adopted from 
Coelli, Rao and Battese (2000). The constant returns to scale model measures 
efficiency in terms of overall technical efficiency (Charnes et al., 1978) assuming 
firms are operating at the optimal scale; however, firms in practice may face 
either economies or diseconomies of scale.  
 
Subsequently, Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) extend the constant 
returns to scale model, by incorporating the variable returns to scale assumption, 
the model is used to assess the efficiency of decision-making units characterised 
by the variable returns to scale model. The variable returns to scale model 
provides the measurement of pure technical efficiency, which is the measurement 
of technical efficiency devoid of the scale efficiency effects. Next, scale 
efficiency is determined by taking the ratio of constant returns to scale efficiency 
scores over variable returns to scale efficiency. In other words, technical 
efficiency can be decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
Technical efficiency represents the deviation from the efficient frontier due to the 
inefficient use of resources; hence, the failure of the firm to extract the maximum 
output from its adopted input levels may be thought of as measuring the 
unproductive use of resources. While pure technical efficiency measures the 
proportional reduction in input usage that can be attained if the firm operates on 
the optimal frontier, scale efficiency refers to the proportional reduction if the 
bank achieves optimum production level.  
 
DEA efficiency score is obtained by taking the maximum ratio of 
weighted outputs to weighted inputs. This measurement allows multiple outputs 
and inputs to be reduced to single “virtual” input (xi) and single “virtual” output 
(yi) by optimal weighs.  
 
Max u,ν  (uʹyt / vʹxt) 
subject to (s.t.) uʹyj / vʹxj  ≤ 1    
 j = 1, 2, …, n       
 u, v ≥ 0,               (1) 
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The vectors xi and yi indicate the K × N inputs matrix and K × M outputs 
matrix for ith decision making units (DMUs) respectively. In addition, the vector  
(uʹyt/vʹxt)represents the ratio of all outputs over all inputs where u is an M × 1 
vector of output weighs and v is a K × 1 vector of input weighs. The efficiency 
for the ith DMU is maximised by finding values for u and v; next, a constant 
constraint ρʹ xt = 1 is imposed to Equation (1).  
 
Max u,ν  (µʹyt) 
 
s.t. ρʹ xt = 1     
 µʹyj – ρʹ xj ≤ 0 
 j = 1, 2, …, n 
 µ, ρ ≥ 0,          (2) 
 
The efficiency measure is then a function of multipliers of the “virtual” 
input-output combination, as in Equation (2). The notations μ and ρ indicate the 
transformation of u and v. The envelopment form is seen below as: 
 
Min θ, λθ 
s.t.  – yt + Y λ ≥ 0,   
 θ xt – X λ  ≥ 0  
 λ ≥ 0,     (3) 
 
where θ is a scalar and λ is an N × 1 vector of constants. The value of θ is the 
efficiency score for the ith DMU and it should be solved n times. If the value is 
equal to 1, the particular DMU is technically efficient. By relaxing the constant 
returns to scale assumption (Banker et al., 1984), the efficiency is assessed on the 
assumption of variable returns to scale; the convexity constraint N1ʹλ=1 is 
applied to Equation (3).  
 
Min θ, λθ, 
s.t.  – yt + Y λ ≥ 0,   
 θ xt – X λ  ≥ 0  
 N1ʹλ=1    
 λ ≥ 0                                     (4) 
 
Measuring market structure  
 
To measure market share in an industry, a market concentration ratio is used. 
Specifically, this study employs a bank concentration index of the highest two 
(CR2), three (CR3) and four (CR4) banks’ total assets, total deposits and total 
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loans. CRk is computed as the sum of the k largest firms’ market shares in the 
market, which takes the form: 
 
=∑ kk iiCR S    (5) 
 
Next, HHI is utilised to capture the general features of market structure. 
HHI includes information of the distribution of market shares as well as the 
number of firms in the industry.3 HHI refers to the sum of the squared market 
shares of all banks in the market, where the market shares are considered weights. 
The formula is given as follows: 
 
2=∑ n tiHHI S       (6)  
 
where 2tS  is the sum of squared market shares of the i-th is firm and n is the 
number of firms in the market.  
 
Measuring market competition 
 
The Lerner index of monopoly power is a non-structural indicator of the degree 
of market competition developed in the context of the new economics industrial 
organization. The computation of the index, which provides measures of 
competition at the firm level, allows the investigation of the causality between 
efficiency and competition at the firm level to be carried out. The Lerner index 
has been computed in several empirical studies on banking competition (e.g. 
Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003; Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007; 
Fernández de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 2005). Basically, it is defined as the 
difference between price (calculated as the ratio of total costs to total assets) and 
marginal cost (expressed as a percentage of prices) divided by price.  
 
The Lerner index measures the degree to which firms can mark-up output 
prices over the marginal cost of production. It can be approximated empirically 
using the translog functional form with three inputs and a single bank output 
(following Shaffer, 1993; and Berg and Kim, 1994). It is assumed that the flow of 
goods and services by banks is proportional to its assets; the price of assets is 
computed as total interest income divided by total assets. To derive marginal 
cost, a translog cost function with one output and three input prices was 
estimated. The econometric model is applied to a pooled sample of banks to 
evaluate the competitive structure, as the heterogeneity is controlled in the 
domestic banking industry. Standard symmetry restrictions of linear homogeneity 
in input prices are imposed by normalising total costs and input prices by one 
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input price (PD) to correct for heteroskedasticity and scale biases. The cost 
function adopted from Pruteanu-Podpiera, et al. (2008) is specified as follows. 
 
2
0 1 2 3 4 5
2 2
6 7 8
1ln + ln (ln ) ln ln ln *ln
2
1 1ln ln ln ln
2 2
α α α α α α
α α α ε
         = + + + + +         
         
        + + +        
        
TC PL PK PL PKQ Q
PD PD PD PD PD
PL PL PKQ
PD PD PD
         (7) 
 
Bank costs (TC) are functioned to output or total assets (Q), the input 
prices which are PL as the price of labour, PK as the price of physical capital and 
PD as the price of borrowed funds; whilst α = 1, 2,…, 9 are parameters to be 
estimated and ε is the error term. Indices for each bank have been dropped in the 
presentation for simplicity. Once the parameters are estimated, the marginal cost 
of banking can be computed. The cost function is estimated using a common 
frontier and allows the derivation of marginal costs (MC) as in Equation (8) and 
the formula for Lerner index is as in Equation (9): 
 
( )1 2 3 4ln ln lnα α α α ε+ + + +itit it it it it
it
TCMC Q Q Q
Q
 (8) 
 
−i it
i
P MCLI
P
 (9) 
 
where pi is the price of production output Q total assets and is calculated as total 
revenue (interest plus non-interest income) divided by total assets. LI stands for 
Lerner index, LI = 0 indicates perfect competition so firm has no market power 
while LI closer to 1 indicates relatively weak price competition thus, the firm has 
market power.  
 
Testing the relationship 
 
This study attempts to employ fixed effects panel regression using Granger-
causality test to assess the causality between bank competition and bank 
efficiency as the number of cross-sections, which are represented by the number 
of banks (approximately 9), is about the same as the number of regressors in the 
model (which is nine); thus, the random effects model could not be employed.  
Nevertheless, to confirm the procedures, the Hausman test will be held.4 The 
fixed effects model assumes that all explanatory variables are correlated with the 
unobserved effects or the specific error term that eliminates this correlation 
within the transformation and “…the crucial distinction between fixed and 
random effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements 
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that are correlated with the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are 
stochastic or not” (Green, 2008, p.183). 
 
The standard procedure for Granger causality test is as below: 
 
0 1 11
α α −== + + +∑
m y y y
it it i iti
y y f u  (10) 
 
0 1 1 1 11 1
β α δ− −= == + + + +∑ ∑
m mx y y x y
it it i it i iti i
x x f y f u  (11) 
 
where y represents efficiency, x represents the competition whilst f represents the 
bank’s individual effect. i and t represent indices for the bank and the time 
period, respectively. The error terms in Equation (10) and Equation (11) are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. Each 
dependent variable is regressed on its yearly lags and on those of the other 
variable.  
 
The dependent variable in Equation (10) is the estimated efficiency 
scores which represents technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency of bank i relative to its peers in year t. The second dependent variable 
in Equation (11) measures the competition indexes of the individual firms. The 
right-hand side variables include lagged values of the dependent variables y 
(efficiency) and x (competition) as a standard procedure for Granger-causality 
models. A significant relationship between current and past (lagged) efficiency 
would imply that the latter contains information that improves the prediction of 
current efficiency. Granger-causality gives historical associations in which a 
change in one variable precedes a change in the other, but does not necessarily 
imply economic causation.  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section presents the results of Granger causality test between bank efficiency 
and competition. The Lerner index is employed to compute the individual 
measures of competition for each sample in bank whilst DEA measured 
efficiency for each bank.  
 
Empirical Results of Competition 
 
The Lerner index of monopoly power is a non-structural indicator of the degree 
of market competition. The computation of Lerner indices which provides 
measures of competition at the firm level, allows the investigation of the 
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causality between efficiency and competition to be performed. The yearly Lerner 
indices are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Lerner indices per year 
 
Year Median Mean s.d. 
1996 0.5808 0.6128 0.0726 
1997 0.6050 0.6211 0.0725 
1998 0.5674 0.6065 0.0881 
1999 0.6253 0.6469 0.1075 
2000 0.6572 0.6829 0.0973 
2001 0.6243 0.6439 0.1176 
2002 0.6139 0.6525 0.1200 
2003 0.6274 0.6765 0.1268 
2004 0.6382 0.6817 0.1345 
2005 0.6648 0.6895 0.1378 
2006 0.6501 0.7012 0.1340 
2007 0.6627 0.7200 0.1336 
2008 0.6340 0.6982 0.1360 
2009 0.6311 0.7028 0.1408 
2010 0.6260 0.6882 0.1379 
2011 0.6190 0.6742 0.1336 
 
Table 1 shows that the Lerner index jumps from 0.6065 in 1998 to 
0.6829 in year 2000; this could be due to the immediate enforcement of merger 
policy effects, announced at the end of the 1990s. Generally, the main trend is 
decreased banking competition over the entire period. Following the mixed 
results of Lerner index between years 1996 to 2001; banking competition 
decreases considerably from year 2002 to year 2007. Thus, one fails to observe 
any evolution towards strong banking competition during the post-merger period. 
Thus, the enforcement of merger policy probably has favoured market power 
during the period. Nevertheless, the effects do not last long, as in 2007 onwards, 
the Lerner index drops considerably. In 2011, the banking competition is at its 
highest value, when the Lerner index is recorded lowest at 0.6742. It would be 
interesting to find out whether the market concentration is positively or 
negatively related to market competition. Table 3 shows an average concentration 
index based on CR2 and the Lerner indices between 1996 and 2011.  
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Table 2 
Concentration ratios and competition indices (1996–2011) 
 
Year Concentration Ratios (CR2) Lerner Index 
1996 0.48 0.6128 
1997 0.51 0.6211 
1998 0.43 0.6065 
1999 0.42 0.6469 
2000 0.41 0.6829 
2001 0.40 0.6439 
2002 0.40 0.6525 
2003 0.37 0.6765 
2004 0.37 0.6817 
2005 0.36 0.6895 
2006 0.37 0.7012 
2007 0.38 0.7200 
2008 0.39 0.6982 
2009 0.39 0.7028 
2010 0.37 0.6882 
2011 0.41 0.6742 
 
Basically, the results in Table 2 suggest that a higher concentration leads 
to a lower degree of market power; even though the banking market is highly 
concentrated, it does not lead to anti-competitive conduct as postulated by the 
traditional SCP hypothesis. It would be interesting to find out whether the market 
concentration is positively or negatively related to market competition, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows a scatter diagram of concentration ratios 
CR2 and Lerner indices. The slightly downward-sloping regression line denotes 
the negative link between market concentration and market power. Nevertheless, 
the linear regression in this figure does not yield any significant relationship 
between concentration and competition; thus, the link is further explored in the 
next section. 
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Figure 1. A scatter diagram of concentration ratios and competition indices 
 
Empirical Results of Efficiency 
 
The results in Table 3 are generated from the DEA common frontier approach. 
The reported mean efficiency is based on the averaging of estimated efficiency 
scores by years of study period. Technical efficiency refers to the firm’s ability to 
maximise output from a given set of input5 and it can be decomposed into two 
components: pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. 
 
Table 3 
Efficiency scores of the common frontier (1996–2011) 
 
Year Technical 
Efficiency 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
Scale Efficiency 
1996 0.6403 0.7596 0.8541 
1997 0.6008 0.7028 0.8679 
1998 0.6440 0.7587 0.8596 
1999 0.6129 0.7422 0.8431 
2000 0.6034 0.7463 0.8257 
2001 0.6264 0.7630 0.8361 
2002 0.6464 0.8092 0.8172 
2003 0.6089 0.7823 0.8030 
2004 0.6164 0.7753 0.8138 
2005 0.5910 0.7658 0.7898 
2006 0.5893 0.7708 0.7816 
2007 0.5619 0.7408 0.7710 
2008 0.5879 0.7868 0.7684 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 3: (continued) 
 
Year Technical 
Efficiency 
Pure Technical 
Efficiency 
Scale Efficiency 
2009 0.5635 0.7718 0.7524 
2010 0.5404 0.7519 0.7524 
2011 0.5458 0.7652 0.7524 
Mean 0.5987 0.7620 0.8055 
 
Generally, the results suggest that throughout the study period, scale 
efficiency (81%) contributes more to technical efficiency than pure technical 
efficiency (76%). The banks performed relatively well with minimal input waste 
in scale efficiency (19%), followed by 34% and 40% in pure technical efficiency 
and technical efficiency, respectively.  
 
Empirical Results of Competition and Efficiency  
 
This section reports the results of the causality tests between competition and 
efficiency. The Granger causality tests are performed for each type of efficiency, 
namely technical, pure technical, and scale efficiency in order to examine the 
relationship between efficiency and competition within the Malaysian banking 
industry. Whilst Panel A reports the causality running from efficiency to 
competition, the results of the causality running from competition to efficiency 
are reported in Panel B of the tables. Based on the Hausman test, the null 
hypothesis that random effect model is consistent and efficient is rejected; thus, 
this study reports the results from fixed effect panel model and are White 
corrected (White, 1980).6 The results are presented in Tables 4 to Table 6.  
 
Panel B in Table 4 shows that the Lerner index negatively Granger-
causes the efficiency, thereby indicating that competition positively Granger-
causes efficiency i.e., an increase in bank competition Granger-causes an increase 
in efficiency. This link is relatively significant at 1% significance level. Panel A 
shows the positive signs of the coefficients indicate a negative running causality 
between efficiency and competition. 
 
Table 5 shows that the negative Granger coefficient demonstrates that the 
Lerner index negatively Granger-causes the efficiency index and thus, the 
competition positively Granger-causes efficiency with the summation of 
coefficients is 10.31. With respect to the Granger causality running from 
competition to efficiency, the link is significant at a 5% level. The negative sign 
of the summation of coefficients indicates the positive link between competition 
and efficiency. As the coefficients of the lags of Lerner index increase, the 
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competition measures decrease and as a result, the pure technical efficiency 
scores decrease. 
 
Table 4 
Granger-casuality – Lerner index (LI) and Technical Efficiency (TE) 
 
Variables 
PANEL A: Dependent – LI PANEL B: Dependent – TE 
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
Intercept 0.2872 0.0438* 0.8073 0.1698* 
LI t-1 0.6153 0.0638* –0.3413 0.1238* 
LIt-2 –0.1738 0.0751** 0.3190 0.1254** 
LIt-3 0.2120 0.0593* –0.3499 0.1034* 
LIt-4 –0.0862 0.0403** –0.0250 0.1113 
LIt-1 = LIt-2 = LIt-3 = 
LIt-4=0 
λ2 (4) = 146.28*  λ2 (4) = 19.88* 
Σ coefficients: 0.5625 0.0697 –0.3973 0.4641 
TEt-1 0.0024 0.0144 0.3453 0.0722* 
TE t-2 –0.0186 0.0196 0.0827 0.0635 
TEt-3 0.0306 0.0163*** –0.1816 0.0581* 
TE t-4 0.0011 0.0194 –0.1619 0.0835*** 
TEt-1 = TEt-2 = TEt-3 
= TEt-4 = 0 
λ2 (4) = 2.57 λ2 (4) = 39.10* 
Σ coefficients: 0.0155 0.0697 0.0845 0.2774 
 
Note: *, **, *** Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level 
 
Table 5  
Granger-causality – Lerner index (LI) and Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) 
 
Variables 
PANEL A: Dependent – LI PANEL B: Dependent – PTE 
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
Intercept 0.2826 0.0424* 0.7899 0.1792* 
LI t-1 0.6220 0.0696* –0.3427 0.1658** 
LIt-2 –0.1939 0.0585* 0.2268 0.1257*** 
LIt-3 0.2261 0.0830* –0.2258 0.1309*** 
LIt-4 –0.0916 0.0337* 0.0167 0.0990 
LIt-1 = LIt-2 = LIt-3 = 
LIt-4=0 
λ2 (4) = 155.62* λ2 (4) = 10.31** 
Σ coefficients: 0.5625 0.2448 –0.3250 0.5214 
PTEt-1 0.0114 0.0142 0.3161 0.1083* 
PTE t-2 –0.0285 0.0163*** 0.0537 0.0631 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5: (continued) 
 
Variables 
PANEL A: Dependent – LI PANEL B: Dependent – PTE 
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
PTEt-3 0.0291 0.0196 –0.0918 0.0899 
PTE t-4 0.0106 0.0187 –0.0254 0.0745 
PTEt-1 = PTEt-2 = PTEt-3 
= PTEt-4 = 0 
λ2 (4) = 6.96 λ2 (4) = 23.03* 
Σ coefficients: 0.0226 0.0687 0.2527 0.3358 
 
Note: *, **, *** Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level 
 
Table 6 
Granger-causality – Lerner index (LI) and Scale Efficiency (SE) 
 
Variables 
PANEL A: Dependent – LI PANEL B: Dependent – SE 
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
Intercept 0.3457 0.0657* 0.1409 0.0308* 
LI t-1 0.5693 0.0638* –0.0247 0.0078* 
LIt-2 –0.0894 0.0696 0.0333 0.0178*** 
LIt-3 0.1467 0.0688** 0.0025 0.0178 
LIt-4 –0.0771 0.0572 –0.0085 0.0146 
LIt-1 = LIt-2 = LIt-3 
= LIt-4=0 
λ2 (4) = 129.27* λ2 (4) = 13.08** 
Σ coefficients: 0.5495 0.2594 0.0025 0.0581 
SEt-1 –0.1209 0.0535** 0.6879 0.0700* 
SE t-2 0.0737 0.0608 0.0810 0.0700 
SEt-3 0.0996 0.0511*** 0.0154 0.0487 
SE t-4 –0.0990 0.0460** 0.0251 0.0381 
SEt-1 = SEt-2 = 
SEt-3 = SEt-4 =0 
λ2 (4) = 12.19** λ2 (4) =  504.73* 
Σ coefficients: –0.0466 0.2113 0.8095 0.2267 
 
Note: *, **, *** Significant at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level 
 
Based on the results in Table 6, it can be concluded that the Lerner index 
positively Granger-causes the scale efficiency index, which means that 
competition negatively Granger-causes efficiency. The joint test is significant at a 
5% significance level and the null hypothesis that efficiency does not Granger-
cause competition, is rejected. The Granger coefficient is reported positive in 
Panel B and therefore, as the competition measures decrease, the scale efficiency 
scores increase.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the case of causality running from banking competition to efficiency, the 
results reveal that there are positive effects of banking competition on technical 
and pure technical efficiencies. Yet, the sign is reversed in the context of scale 
efficiency. The positive sign of ‘competition-efficiency’ link, affirmed the quiet-
life hypothesis. “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life” (Hicks, 1935, p. 
9), this suggests that banks with more market power are not exposed to 
competition and therefore, they are not able to reduce costs and attain higher 
efficiency. This preposition is supported in previous studies, for instance Berger 
and Hannan (1998) discovered that the quiet-life hypothesis prevailed in the U.S. 
banking sector. The authors added that in a highly concentrated market, bank 
managers do not work hard to control costs and managers pursue other objectives 
other than profit maximisation. In this kind of environment, managers are able to 
exercise market power by setting prices above marginal costs. As a result, costs 
of production increases, the social welfare is hampered and eventually, it halters 
cost efficiency. 
 
From a policy perspective, the results are of interest to authorities which 
are seeking for assessment of the trade-off between banking efficiency and 
competition. As quoted in Central Bank of Malaysia’s Governor Speech (Central 
Bank of Malaysia, 2000), “The merger and consolidation program is a necessary 
pre-condition to create strong, efficient and competitive domestic banking 
institutions”. Both elements are desirable to policymaker’s point of view because 
a competitive banking environment allocates resources more efficient to the 
society and eventually, it enhances the financial stability of a nation.  
 
This study found that, a heightened banking competition had resulted in a 
higher technical efficiency of banks. On contrary, an intensified banking 
competition yielded a lower scale efficiency of banks. The results of this study 
offer cautions to the authorities; it shows that efficiency and competition cannot 
be achieved with a single directive policy. This study recommends that the 
authorities should tackle the issue by addressing policies based on continual 
basis. In this vein, it is important for the government to make continuous effort, 
persistently towards promoting competition in banking industry; the 
competitiveness of banking industry will results in higher efficiency and better 
innovation that eventually, lead to a greater variety of products, lower prices, 
higher consumer welfare, lower market power and better access to financial 
products and services. Adding to that, a heightened competition also would 
encourage banks to identify new lending opportunities while expanding their 
customer base in order to generate income.  
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NOTES 
 
1. With regard to the Malaysian banking sector, because of the 
consolidation process undertaken in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis, the 
number of domestic commercial banks was reduced from 24 to only 10 
banks; however, Southern Bank merged voluntarily with CIMB bank in 
May 2007. 
2. CPI is preferred for use as the deflator in many studies such as Dogan 
and Fausten (2003) and Detragiache and Gupta (2004). Okuda and 
Hashimoto (2004) stated that when using panel data, it is necessary to use 
a deflator in order to keep outputs from various years comparable. 
3. Interested readers are referred to Bikker and Haaf (2002) for 
comprehensive merits and demerits of both CRk and HHI. 
4. To decide between fixed or random effects, Hausman (1978) suggested a 
test to check whether the individual effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables. The null hypothesis of the test is no correlation 
between individual effects and the regressors; while the alternative 
hypothesis implies that the individual effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, thus the fixed effects approach is consistent and 
efficient. 
5. Berger and Humphrey (1992) define technical inefficiency as the cost 
related to allocating more input than the minimum level, or producing 
less than the efficient level of production. 
6. The White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent statistics and the Wald 
test which follows an F-distribution are used throughout this study. 
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